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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE
WTO?**
Dominic A. Gentile*
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, the international community has been forced to rec-
ognize that the state of the environment is a global concern.1 Unfor-
tunately, the nature of the problem itself is not one which can be ad-
dressed unilaterally, as it does not relate exclusively to any individ-
ual state.2 Concurrent with this growing public awareness is a rec-
ognition of the interrelationship between trade liberalization and the
environment. 3 The revelation that the desire to protect health and
the environment sometimes comes into conflict with the stated goals
of international trade, although not new, came into the spotlight in
1999.4 The convergence of thousands of protestors in Seattle for the
gathering of the World Trade Organization's Third Ministerial Con-
ference illustrated the growing divide between free traders and envi-
ronmentalists. 5 This signaled a new round in a conflict that has
grown exponentially since the creation of the World Trade Organiza-
** This article was originally published in Volume XIX.1 of the Fordham
Environmental Law Review and is reprinted to correct certain editorial errors.
* Dominic Gentile is a graduate of Fordham University School of Law,
2008. I would like to thank Professor Robert Howse, whose scholarship and guid-
ance were profoundly helpful in the preparation of this note. My thanks also go to
the members of the Fordham Environmental Law Review for their assistance and
hard work. Of course, all errors and omissions remain solely my responsibility.
1. See Tania Voon, Sizing Up the WTO: Trade-Environment Conflict and the
Kyoto Protocol, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 71 (2000).
2. See id. at 72.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. (discussing the "growing disquiet over the unresolved conflict be-
tween trade and the environment").
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tion in 1995. To much of the world, the WTO is an organization that
has exceeded its mandate; it not only sets the rules for international
trade, but it establishes the environmental protection standards for its
member governments as well.
6
This note will attempt to examine the sometimes conflicting inter-
ests of the WTO and environmental advocates, specifically the struc-
ture and policies of the WTO as they relate to environmental protec-
tion. Part II provides some of the historical background and sets the
stage for the current debate, including the formation of the WTO,
and its reaction to the sometimes harsh criticism it has endured. Part
III discusses the official position of the WTO, as it relates to envi-
ronmental issues, and juxtaposes it against some of the Appellate
Body's decisions in this regard. Part V offers some of the more no-
table suggestions for reconciling the conflict between WTO stan-
dards and environmental protection concerns.
II. THE DEBATE BETWEEN FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The origins of the trade and environment debate date as far back as
1972. 7 At the time, environmental protection concerns were just
coming into the forefront of domestic and international policy con-
siderations.8 The recognition of a need for an international forum in
which to hear environmental management concerns led to the 1972
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. 9 In preparation
for this conference, GATT members created the Working Group on
Environmental Measures and International Trade (EMIT).1" Al-
though EMIT did not conduct its first meeting until twenty years
later, its first conference was conducted right before the 1992 United
6. Doaa Abdel Motaal, Trade and the Environment in the World Trade Or-
ganization: Dispelling Misconceptions, 8 REV. OF EUR. CMTY. & INT'L ENVTL. L.
330, 330 (1999).
7. See Julio Garcia Burgues & Mikel Insausti Muguruza, Trade and the Envi-
ronment in the WTO: The European Community's Participation in the Committee
on Trade and Environment, 6 REV. OF EUR. CMTY. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 163, 163
(1997).
8. See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge:
Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Envi-
ronment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2001).
9. See Katie A. Lane, Comment, Protectionism or Environmental Activism?
The WTO as a Means of Reconciling the Conflict Between Global Free Trade and
the Environment, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 103, 105 (2001).
10. See Shaffer, supra note 8, at 17.
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Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
was held in Rio de Janeiro, (also known as the Rio Earth Summit).'"
This was no coincidence, in that the EMIT group was convened at
the request of members of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), in anticipation of UNCED. 12
During the interim period between these two conferences impor-
tant developments took place in several environmental forums. In
1983, the United Nations convened the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development to address the growing concern "about
the accelerating deterioration of the human environment and natural
resources and the consequences of that deterioration for economic
and social development." The Commission's report, entitled "Our
Common Future" (also known as the Brundtland Report), coined the
term "sustainable development."' 4 It identified poverty as one of the
most important causes of environmental degradation, and proposed
that greater economic growth through increased international trade
would act to reverse this trend. 15
The Rio Earth Summit focused attention on the role of interna-
tional trade in combating poverty and protection of the environ-
ment. 16 Specifically, Agenda 21, the measure adopted at the confer-
ence, emphasizes the importance of international trade in promoting
the concept of "sustainable development." 17 In the latter part of the
Uruguay Round of negotiations, as a result of the renewed interest in
the relationship between trade and the environment, the Preamble to
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, reference was
made to the importance of working towards sustained develop-
ment.18 Members recognized that:
11. U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev.: Rio Declaration on Env't and Dev.,
June 3-14, 1992, 31 ILM 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
12. WTO Secretariat, Trade and Environment at the WTO, (Apr. 2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/envire/envirwto2004_e.pdf [hereinafter
2004 Report].
13. U.N Env't Program Governing Council, Report of the World Comm'n on
Env't and Dev., Our Common Future, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/13, ES-7 (Mar. 20,
1987) (prepared by Gro Brundtland) [hereinafter the Brundtland Report].
14. Id.
15. See id,
16. WTO, Early Years: Emerging Environment Debate in GATTiWTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/envire/histl-e.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2009).
17. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 4.
18. Id.
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[T]heir relations in the field of trade and economic en-
deavor should be conducted with a view to raising stan-
dards of living ... while allowing for the optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development seeking both to protect and pre-
serve the environment and to enhance the means for do-
ing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs
and concerns at different levels of economic develop-
ment. 19
In addition, a ministerial decision arising out of the Marrakesh
Agreement was adopted, calling for the establishment of the Com-
mittee on Trade and Environment (CTE). 20 The Committee's man-
date calls for the identification of the relationship between trade
measures and environmental measures in order to promote sustain-
able development. Additionally, it is incumbent upon the CTE to
make appropriate recommendations as to the necessity of any modi-
fications to the provisions of the multilateral trading system. 2 1 To
the extent the CTE has this broad mandate, it is significantly more
influential than its predecessor the EMIT group. 22
More recently, at the Doha Ministerial Conference begun in No-
vember 2001, the ministers agreed to launch negotiations on the rela-
tionship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations
set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEA's). 23 These
talks will seek to clarify the relationship between trade measures
taken under the environmental agreements and WTO rules. 24 The
negotiations themselves are conducted in "special sessions" of the
CTE, in which the Committee acts as the forum whereby the envi-
ronmental and developmental aspects of international trade are de-
bated.25 The CTE "regular" is charged with examining the effects of
environmental measures on market access, the intellectual property
19. Id. at 4-5.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. WTO, The Doha Declaration Explained, http://www.wto.org/english/tra-
tope/ddae/dohaexplainede.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
24. Id.
25. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 5.
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agreement and biodiversity, and labeling for environmental pur-
26poses.
The increased interest in the relationship between trade and the en-
vironment was spurred by the progressive reinforcement of envi-
ronmental policies at the national and international level, and the
concerns these policies addressed. 17 Chief among these concerns
was the possible effects that environmental measures might have on
trade and competitiveness.28 Just as importantly, however, follow-
ing some GATT panel decisions, a widespread perception was be-
ginning to emerge among environmental advocates that the multilat-
eral trading system was not sufficiently sympathetic to environ-
mental concerns.
29
III. WTO RULES: ARE THEY A CAUSE FOR CONCERN?
A. The Position of the WTO
The WTO has no specific agreement dealing with the environment.
It does, however, have different provisions within its articles con-
firming the rights of its members to implement environmental pro-
tection measures, provided certain conditions are met.30 Although
the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement contains language affirm-
ing the importance of sustainable development and environmental
protection, the WTO is not an environmental protection agency and
does not aspire to be one. 31 The organization's principal mandate is
to work towards an open, equitable, non-discriminatory trading sys-
tem.32 It only addresses environmental issues insofar as these poli-
cies have trade related aspects with a discriminatory impact on
trade.33 In defending itself from the criticism of being environmen-
tally unfriendly, the WTO states that the task of setting international
rules for environmental protection is given to other environmental
agencies and conventions. 34 This, notwithstanding, while the reduc-
26. See id.
27. Burgues & Muguruza, supra note 7.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 7.
31. Id. at 6.
32. See Motaal, supra note 6, at 330.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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tion of tariffs has resulted in an expansion of international trade, it
has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the exploita-
tion of the earth's natural resources.35 While technically correct in
this regard, the WTO must also recognize its role in the application
of trade policy which serves to undermine ecological protections
established by the very environmental agencies and conventions to
which they defer.
To further illuminate this point, one must assess how the WTO
deals with the trade related aspects of environmental policies. This
encompasses an examination of various agreements entered into by
WTO members, as well as some of the decisions rendered by the
Dispute Settlement Body. The WTO has categorized trade related
environmental concerns thusly: while some take the form of product
standards requiring a certain level of environmental efficiency,
36
others take the form of outright bans, foreclosing the use of some
environmentally harmful goods. 37 Yet, others may exist in the form
of government subsidies for environmentally friendly merchandise
or production methods.38
Product standards are dealt with primarily through the WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The TBT Agree-
ment has been designed by WTO member governments in such a
way that it acknowledges the right of each individual government to
set environmental protection standards at a level it considers appro-priate. 39 Moreover, the TBT recognizes the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health, and the protection of the environment
as being legitimate objectives for member countries to pursue. 40
35. Andy J. Rich, International Trade and the Environment: A Seething An-
tagonism?, 12 Currents: S. Tex. INT'L TRADE L.J. 17 (2003).
36. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, reprinted in Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
33 ILM 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TBTAgreement].
37. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, T.I.A.S 1700, 55 U.N.T.S 187 [hereinafter the GATT]. The first General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade came into effect in 1947, however, as a result of
the various negotiating rounds, including the major overhaul in 1994, the agree-
ment exists in its current form as GATT 1994.
38. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, reprinted in
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 ILM 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCMAgreement].
39. TBTAgreement, supra note 36, at Preamble.
40. See id.
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However, the Agreement attempts to ensure that these standards are
neither discriminatory, nor create unnecessary obstacles to interna-
tional trade. 4 1 For example, a country must apply any environmental
standard for a product to all such products, regardless of their
source.4 2 It must not relax its standards towards those which are
imported from a particular source, nor towards those that are pro-
duced domestically.43 In addition, though member governments
may develop product standards that create obstacles to trade, they
must ensure that these obstacles are not avoidable ones.44 If avoid-
able, the least trade restrictive measure must be sought.45
WTO rules pertaining to bans are set out in Article XI of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Article XI for the
most part forbids the use, by a member country, of quantitative re-
strictions and prohibitions. As a result, any ban put into place by a
WTO member would automatically be inconsistent with Article
XI.4 6 Prior to the creation of the WTO, however, GATT contracting
parties recognized the need for a trade measure that might be incon-
sistent with the rules of Article XI. 47 Thus, the General Exceptions
of Article XX were created. These exceptions allow member nations
to implement trade policies with environmental objectives that are
otherwise inconsistent with GATT rules, provided certain conditions
are met.48 First, the measure must fall within one of the listed ex-
ceptions specified in Article XX. In the context of measures ad-
dressing environmental concerns, the applicable exceptions include:
1) the measure is "necessary" for the protection of the environment
(XXb), or 2) "related" to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources (XXg). Second, the measure must meet the conditions of
Article XX's chapeau. It must be applied in a way that does not
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries,
or act as a disguised restriction on trade. 49 It is important to note
41. Id. at art. 2.2. The Agreement calls for non-discrimination in the prepara-
tion, adoption and application of product specifications and conformity assessment
procedures.
42. Id. atarts. 2.1, 5.1.1.
43. Id. at art. 2.1.
44. Id. at art. 2.2.
45. Id. Contrast this standard with that of the GA 77'; see discussion infra pp.
222-223.
46. See GATT, supra note 37, at art. XI.
47. 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 50.
48. See GATT, supra note 37, at art. XX.
49. Id.
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that the analysis for an Article XX exception does not put the neces-
sity of the environmental objective into question; instead it questions
the necessity of the trade measure used to achieve the objective.5 °
For example, if a WTO member government can prove that a ban
implemented falls within Article XX (b) or (g), and the ban is not
applied in a discriminatory manner either between countries or in a
way that affords protection to domestic industry (chapeau), than it
can circumvent Article XI by way of an Article XX exception.
With respect to subsidization, the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) is an agreement that was created by
WTO member governments to regulate their use of subsidies for
products manufactured within a given state. 51 Under this agreement,
certain subsidies were designated "non-actionable," thus generally
removing them from the prohibition. 52 These non-actionable subsi-
dies expired in 2000, pursuant to Article 31 of the SCM Agree-
ment. 53  Previously, however, non-actionable subsidies related to
environmental concerns were permitted when used to promote the
adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements.
Once again, certain conditions had to be met for their application.
54
For instance, the subsidy had to be made available to all firms which
adopted the new equipment, was limited to 20% of the adaptation
costs, did not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted
investment, was directly limited to planned reduction in a firm's pol-
lution, and did not cover any manufacturing cost savings. 55 In addi-
56tion, the subsidy must be a one time non-recurring measure.
Therefore, subsidies having an adverse impact on trade were still
allowed under the SCM Agreement, so long as they were used for
certain environmental purposes.
As mentioned earlier the WTO is quick to point out that it does not
set the rules for environmental protection or establish any standards
in this regard.57 It only sets conditions that environmental measures
50. Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting As-
bestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter EC-Asbestos].
51. SCMAgreement, supra note 38.
52. Id. at art. 8.
53. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOwSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 269 (3d ed. 2005).
54. SCMAgreement, supra note 38, at art. 8.2 (c).
55. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 269.
56. Id.
57. See discussion, supra p. 201.
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must meet when they have an impact on trade. Though these rules
are not designed to undermine the environmental protection objec-
tives of member governments, their application has effectively re-
duced the ability of countries to set their own environmental agen-
da.58 This puts the WTO's stated position at odds with the practical
effects of their policies. This contradiction is underscored in several
panel and Appellate Body decisions involving U.S. attempts to set
its own environmental policy.
B. WTO v. U.S. Domestic Environmental Regulations
WTO panels and the Appellate Body are the established organs to
resolve disputes among WTO members. Although they are not
bound by precedent in the same manner as domestic courts in the
U.S., previous rulings on similar issues are likely to be the best indi-
cators for predicting how the WTO might deal with disputes involv-
ing environmental matters. Several American attempts at imple-
menting a policy centered on "sustainable development," have been
thwarted by certain key rulings. The following cases illustrate the
concerns of some environmental advocates for the future viability of
environmental protection measures.
1. Tuna-Dolphin I
The first of these decisions arose out of a dispute between the
United States and Mexico (Tuna-Dolphin 1). 59 In 1972, the U.S.
enacted legislation in the form of the Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA). 60 The MMPA established a moratorium on the taking
of dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean by U.S. fisher-
men. 61 It also provided protection for whales, seals, polar bears and
other sea mammals. 62 The Act regulated the harvesting of yellowfin
tuna in the hope of reducing dolphin mortality incidental to the use
58. See Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO, 8 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 143 (2005).
59. Report of the Panel, United States - Restriction on Imports of Tuna (Sept.
3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39 th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I].
60. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2000)
[hereinafter MMPA].
61. Carol J. Miller & Jennifer L. Croston, WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental
Objectives: Assessment of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act,
37 AM. Bus. L.J. 73, 98 (1999); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a).
62. Miller & Croston, supra note 61, at 97.
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63
of purse-sein fishing nets, and provided for a ban on tuna imported
from "intermediary nations." 64 By 1977 the MMPA helped reduce
dolphin mortality related to tuna harvesting from 300,000 dolphin
deaths per year to a little over 25,000.65 As the statute applied solely
to U.S. vessels, several American fishermen, in an attempt to avoid
the domestic restrictions, engaged in the practice of sailing under
foreign flags. 6 6 Congress responded by amending the MMPA in
1984, requiring foreign imports of tuna to have been harvested under
comparable or equivalent standards as those employed by U.S. ves-
sels.67 If these standards were not met the Secretary of Commerce
was empowered to issue an embargo on the importation of these en-
vironmentally unfriendly products. 68 The import of tuna was essen-
tially prohibited, unless a determination was made by U.S. authori-
ties that they were caught using measures comparable to those em-
ployed by the United States.69
The restrictions imposed by the MMPA were challenged by Mex-
ico under Articles I, III, IX, XI and XIII of the GATT 1947. Spe-
cifically, Mexico challenged the provision in the MMPA that prohib-
ited the importation into the U.S. of yellowfin tuna, which were
caught using methods that resulted in the collateral injury to dol-
phins. The Panel concluded that the import restrictions were not
internal regulations in accordance with Article III, were inconsistent
with Article XI, and were not saved by the exceptions of Article XX.
The Panel's decision in this case was not adopted because under the
GATT 1947 a consensus was required to accept a decision prior to
its adoption, and the U.S. and Mexico settled their differences out-
side of the GATT framework. Nonetheless, the most significant por-
tion of the report concerned the extraterritorial application of the
MMPA. The Panel ruled that jurisdiction to protect plant or animal
life does not extend outside the territory of the nation imposing the
restriction. 71 The Panel's approach to extraterritoriality focused on
Article XX (g)'s requirement that the measure be taken in conjunc-
63. See MMPA, supra note 60 § 1362 (5).
64. Id.
65. Miller & Croston, supra note 61, at 98.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 59, 3.1-3.9.
71. Id. 5.31.
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tion with the restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
According to the Panel: "A country can effectively control the pro-
duction or consumption of an exhaustible natural resource only to
the extent that the production or consumption is under its jurisdic-
tion. 7
2
Another key portion of the Panel decision involved its "like prod-
uct" analysis. The Panel concluded that differences in a process or
production method were not relevant to determining "likeness. 73
This case resulted in the rule that products produced in an environ-
mentally unfriendly manner cannot be treated differently than prod-
ucts produced in an environmentally friendly manner, on the sole
basis of the difference in process or production method. 74 Conse-
quently, the sale of the tuna within U.S. borders did not afford the
right to protect animals in international waters outside of the United
States affected by the "process" used to obtain the tuna.
2. Tuna-Dolphin II
A similar complaint was made by the European Economic Com-
munity and the Netherlands in the second Tuna-Dolphin case (Tuna-
Dolphin 1I).75 This second panel decision upheld parts of the previ-
ous panel's findings and rejected others. 76  As in the previous re-
port, the Panel emphasized the importance of promoting sustainable
development, but refused to endorse any particular method of envi-
ronmental conservation. 77 The United States continued to prohibit
imports that had been harvested in violation of the MMPA both from
"primary nations" and "intermediary nations., 78 The complainants
argued that the embargo constituted a quantitative restriction in vio-
lation of Article XI. Once again, the U.S. countered that the MMPA
qualified for an exception under Article XX (b) and (g), and that the
embargo was necessary to enforce the restrictions on the import of
tuna harvested in a manner inconsistent with U.S. standards. 79 Ac-
72. Id.
73. PETER VAN DEN BosSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 360 (5th prtg. 2007).
74. Id. at316.
75. Report of the Panel, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, un-
adopted, DS29/R (June 16, 1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I1].
76. See generally id
77. Id. 5.42.
78. Id. 2.
79. Id. 3.6.
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cording to the U.S., this necessarily included restrictions on imports
from countries that process and export tuna from sources whose
methods did not conform to these standards, so called "intermediary
nations."
The Panel concluded that the U.S. import restrictions were not jus-
tified as measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life
and health under Article XX (b), nor were they "primarily aimed" at
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, as required under
Article XX (g). 80 The U.S did prevail, however, on one important
point; the Panel deemed efforts to protect dolphins to be a valid pol-
icy to conserve an exhaustible natural resource. 8 ' In so doing, the
Panel noted that the provisions of Article XX (g) were not limited to
resources located in the territory of the country imposing the restric-
82tions. This conclusion was in direct contravention of the narrower
domestic reading of Article XX (g) by the earlier Tuna-dolphin I
panel.
Of particular import was the Panel's suggestion that international
environmental treaties were irrelevant to its analysis. The reason
given by the Panel was that these treaties were not concluded by the
contracting parties to the GATT, and thus were not applicable to the
interpretation of its provisions. 83 The implication of this position is
that international agreements existing outside of the GATT are mar-
ginalized, and thus rendered moot when considered in any trade re-
lated context.84 Not only is this reasoning untenable in the context
of environmental protection efforts, it is inconsistent with the Vienna
Convention. 85
As was the case in Tuna-Dolphin I, the United States was able to
veto the adoption of the Tuna-Dolphin II panel report. Nonetheless,
these two cases became the standard by which unilaterally applied
environmental measures are evaluated. 6 The United States was
placed in the difficult position of having to make the choice between
80. Id. 5.27.
81. Id. 5.13.
82. Id. 5.16-5.20.
83. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 134-35. The authors suggest
that the Panel's interpretation in this regard implies a conception of the GATT as a
"self-contained regime, sealed off from the norms and rules of other international
regimes and the values and constituencies that these reflect." Id.
84. Id.
85. See Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties art. 31, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
86. See Miller & Croston, supra note 61, at 107.
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following its own statutorily enacted mandates or abiding by the ob-
ligations imposed upon it by the GATT. 87 If the United States com-
plied with the decisions of the GATT panel, it would be forced to
retreat on conservation policies that reflected the prevailing public
sentiment of its citizenry.88 By refusing to follow the Panel's deci-
sion, however, the U.S. would jeopardize its standing in the interna-
tional community and risk suffering sanctions from affected na-
tions.89 These rulings underscore the tension between environmental
protection efforts on the one hand and international trade on the oth-
er.
3. Reformulated Gasoline
Shortly after the formation of the WTO, Venezuela and Brazil re-
quested the formation of a dispute settlement panel to decide wheth-
er certain regulations of the United States Clean Air Act, and more
specifically, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)
"Gasoline Rule" 91 were inconsistent with WTO obligations. 92 These
regulations, intended to reduce air pollution in the United States,
required that gasoline sold in certain U.S regions with high levels of
air pollution meet a specific pollution standard.93 This "reformu-
lated" gasoline was contrasted with "conventional" gasoline whose
sale was allowed in all other parts of the U.S. 9 4 The conventional
gasoline had to meet, at a minimum, the same pollution standards as
gasoline sold in 1990 (baseline standard). 95 One of the objectives of
the conventional gasoline standard was to prevent the blending of
pollutants removed from the reformulated gasoline into conventional
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000). The Clean Air Act sets
limits on certain air pollutants, including how much can be in the air anywhere in
the United States. The Environmental Protection Agency is the regulating author-
ity charged with enforcing the Act's provisions. Individual states may have more
stringent air pollution laws, but they may not have less restrictive standards.
91. Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 40 C.F.R. § 80 (2007).
92. Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Panel Report].
93. See Clean Air Act § 211 (k)(2)-(3) (2000).
94. See id. § 211 (k)(8).
95. Id.
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gasoline. 96 To achieve this objective for producers who were not in
operation in 1990, and for importers, a statutory baseline was estab-
lished in place of the producer specific 1990 baseline. 97 At the heart
of the dispute was the fact that most foreign producers were not eli-
gible for the less strict individual baselines, and instead had to rely
on the harsher statutory baselines.
98
The claim against the U.S. was based on the position that the regu-
lations of the Clean Air Act, and the Gasoline Rule, were inconsis-
tent with Article III and not covered by the exceptions of Article
XX. 99 The Panel concluded that the regulations treated importers of
gasoline less favorably than domestic producers, and were therefore
inconsistent with the provisions of Article 111. 100 Although the Panel
found that the regulation was not excepted by Article XX (b), (d)
and (g), the Appellate Body ruled that the baseline standards fell
within the Article XX (g) exception. 10 1 They did not, however,
comply with the chapeau of Article XX, which prohibits the applica-
tion of an environmental measure in a way that constitutes: 1) arbi-
trary discrimination; 2) unjustifiable discrimination; or 3) a dis-
guised restriction of international trade.I°2 In the Appellate Body's
view, the fundamental purpose of the introductory clause was to
avoid abuse or illegitimate use of the Article XX exceptions. 0 3 In
applying the introductory clause, the Appellate Body found that the
United States had alternative courses of action available to it when it
implemented the Clean Air Act.'°4 This meant that the Appellate
Body found the measures to be related to the conservation of an ex-
haustible natural resource (clean air), and were made in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption, but were
nevertheless an unjustifiable discrimination and a disguised restric-
tion on international trade. 105 The basis for this conclusion was that
the domestic producers had the choice to establish their own 1990
96. See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 92, 2.4.
97. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.
98. See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 92, 3.7.
99. Id. 3.1.
100. Id. 6.10. This issue was not considered by the Appellate Body, in that the
United States did not appeal this portion of the Panel's ruling.
101. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 35 ILM 603,633 (May 20, 1996).
102. Id. at 633.
103. Id. at 629.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 633.
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baselines or rely on the statutory baseline. Foreign producers, on the
other hand, did not have the option of establishing facility specific
baselines. 106 The Appellate Body suggested that alternative courses
of action could have included the imposition of statutory baselines
for all gasoline producers, or the availability of individual baselines
for all foreign, as well as domestic, producers.1
0 7
Finally, the Appellate Body concluded that cooperative arrange-
ments could have been sought by the U.S with foreign producers to
reach the same result. 10 8 This raises the issue of what has been
termed "multilateral environmental agreements," and their relation-
ship to the provisions of the multilateral trading system. The Appel-
late Body appears to endorse the widely held recognition that resort
to multilateral solutions to transboundary environmental problems is
preferable to unilateral solutions. 10 9 It has not, however, taken the
opportunity to directly confront the potential conflicts inherent in
these types of agreements.
4. Shrimp-Turtle I
The most recent case involving U.S. attempts at implementing en-
vironmental protection measures directly affecting trade arose when
certain provisions of the U.S. Endangered Species Act were chal-
lenged by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand."10 In 1989, the
United States Congress amended Title 8 of the Endangered Species
Act, with Section 609, to afford protection to sea turtles on an inter-
national basis."' Prior to its amendment, the Act extended protec-
tion to various species of sea turtles only within U.S waters.1 2 In
circumstances similar to those in the Tuna-Dolphin case, sea turtle
mortality was directly related to commercial shrimp trawling activ-
106. Id. at 609-10.
107. Id. at 629.
108. Id. at 631.
109. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 35.
110. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report]; see also Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibi-
tion of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS59/R (May 15, 1998) [here-
inafter Shrimp-Turtle I Panel Report].
111. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (2000).
112. Id. §§ 1531-1544(2000).
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ity. 1 3 Specifically, the use of nets in the harvesting of shrimp re-
sulted in the incidental death of sea turtles to the extent that they fell
under the protections of the Endangered Species Act.' 14 Section 609
required shrimp trawlers to use "turtle excluder devices" (TED's) in
their shrimp nets when fishing in areas that were likely to be turtle
habitats.' 15 The statute further restricted the importation of shrimp
and shrimp products to countries with comparable regulations in
place, or who could demonstrate that their fishing practices did not
pose a threat to turtles. Countries could demonstrate compliance
through a certification process. 116 In practice, exporting countries
had to demonstrate the use of TED's in order to be certified under
this law. 117  The certification requirement was immediately chal-
lenged under Articles I, III and XI of the GATT. The Panel estab-
lished to decide the issue concluded that the certification require-
ment violated Article XI (1), and was not justified under Article
XX. 118 The United States did not argue, nor did the Panel consider,
the import restriction as an overall regulatory measure enforced at
the border.' 9 Under this type of scheme the applicable provision
under WTO law is Article III's National Treatment obligation. As
the Appellate Body would decide sometime later, the key distinction
is whether a border measure is backed up by some internal regula-
tion. 12  The Panel ruled that the measures imposed by the United
States were outside the ambit of Article XX, and were precluded by
the chapeau of Article XX as a threat to the integrity of the trading
system. 121
On review, the Appellate Body reversed the sequence of analysis
undertaken by the Panel. 122 According to the Appellate Body, the
more sound approach is to first determine whether the measure falls
under the exceptions listed under Article XX (a)-(j). If so, the next
step is to examine whether the measure conforms to the chapeau's
113. See George Cavros, The Hidden Cost of Free Trade: The Impact of United
States World Trade Obligations on United States Environmental Law Sovereignty,
9 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP L. 563, 568 (2002-2003).
114. See id.
115. See 16 U.S.C. § 1537.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Shrimp-Turtle I Panel Report, supra note 110, 7.12, 7.62.
119. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 529.
120. See EC-Asbestos, supra note 50.
121. Shrimp-Turtle I Panel Report, supra note 110, 7.51.
122. Shrimp-Turtle lAB Report, supra note 110, 117-23.
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requirements. First, the Appellate Body concluded that the excep-
tions of Article XX exist in order to justify otherwise inconsistent
trade measures, so long as the policies are recognized as legiti-
mate. 123 For this reason, the Appellate Body proceeded to analyze
Section 609 under Article XX (g). Recognizing that sea turtles were
an endangered species, 12 4 the conclusion that they were an exhausti-
ble natural resource followed easily. 12 5 Thus, the first prong of the
analysis was satisfied. Next, the Appellate Body determined that the
measure was "related to" the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource. 126 The policy was a justifiable means to the ends of pro-
tecting sea turtles satisfying the second prong of Article XX (g).
After finding the measure to have been applied "in conjunction with"
restrictions on domestic production or consumption, the Appellate
Body proceeded to the final step of the analysis; the chapeau of Arti-
cle XX. 127
Under the chapeau's second tier of analysis, the Appellate Body
concluded that while the measure was provisionally justified under
Article XX (g), it did not meet the conditions set out in the chapeau,
and therefore was not exempt. Notwithstanding the fact that a multi-
lateral environmental agreement was in place,128 the Appellate Body
found the United States was guilty of unjustifiable discrimination
because of its failure to conduct bilateral or multilateral negotiations
with affected countries in an attempt to come to a cooperative
agreement. 129 The Appellate Body noted that the United States did
123. Id. 121.
124. Id. 132.
125. Id. 134. The Appellate Body pointed out that "One lesson that modem
biological sciences teach us is that living species, though in principle, capable of
reproduction and, in that sense, 'renewable', are in certain circumstances indeed
susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human
activities." Id. 128.
126. Id. 142.
127. Id. 145.
128. The United States and all of the complaining parties in this case were, and
still are, Contracting Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The Agreement's aim is to en-
sure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not
threaten their survival. In fact, the Appellate Body adopted this multilateral envi-
romnental agreement as an interpretational tool to conclude that sea turtles were in
fact an endangered species.
129. The Appellate Body relied on Section 609's requirement that negotiations
be conducted in an effort to come to a cooperative agreement with regard to sea
turtle protection.
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negotiate with some countries to produce the Inter-American Con-
vention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, but not
with others.' 30 The result of the failure of the United States in this
regard was a finding of unjustifiable discrimination. Some observers
have taken this part of the Appellate Body's ruling to impart a stand
alone duty to negotiate as a precondition to employing an environ-
mental trade measure.' 3 1  This interpretation, however, does not
comport with the specific wording of the Appellate Body in their
decision. The Appellate Body never asserted that the chapeau of
Article XX imposed a "sui generis" obligation to negotiate.' 32 Ra-
ther, it requires a member to negotiate in good faith with affected
parties to the extent that it has already done so with other parties af-
fected by the trade measure.' 33 Supporting this interpretation is the
Appellate Body's focus on the ordinary meaning of the text of Arti-
cle XX, specifically its chapeau. 134 There is nothing in the text of
Article XX or its chapeau that can be read to impose a duty to nego-
tiate in the absence of discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail. 135 Although the Appellate Body relied on
the Rio Declaration and other sources of international environmental
law to hold that global environmental concerns should be dealt with
cooperatively and not unilaterally, it did not incorporate into the
chapeau a duty to negotiate. 136 Rather, it was using international
environmental law as a baseline in assessing whether the U.S. meas-
ure was unjustifiable. 137
In perhaps the most significant portion of the decision, the Appel-
late Body reversed the Panel decision on the issue of whether trade
measures directed at other states' environmental policies was consis-
130. Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea
Turtles, Dec. 1, 1996, 34 ILM 1246 (1998).
131. See John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and
the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2004).
132. Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A
New Legal Baseline for The Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 491, 507 (2002).
133. Id. at 508.
134. See Shrimp-Turtle lAB Report, supra note 110, 150.
135. See Howard F. Chang, Environmental Trade Measures, The Shrimp-Turtle
Rulings, and The Ordinary Meaning of The Text of The GAIT, 8 CHAP. L. REV.
25, 47 (2005).
136. Howse, supra note 132, at 508.
137. Id.
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tent with Article XX (g).138 Consequently, these measures are no
longer per se inconsistent with the objectives of the multilateral trad-
ing system. 139 The Appellate Body was careful not to uncondition-
ally endorse the use of extra-jurisdictional measures in that it re-
quired "a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered
marine populations involved and the United States for the purposes
of Article XX (g).,1 40 In another significant departure from the prior
decisions, the Appellate Body determined that unilateral trade meas-
ures were not a priori excluded from the protection of Article XX.141
Such a reading, according to the judges, would render most, if not
all, the provisions of Article XX "inutile."1
42
In rejecting the approach of the Panel decisions in both Tuna-
Dolphin cases, the Appellate body emphasized the importance of the
chapeau of Article XX in ensuring that environmental measures are
not applied without regard for the differences among countries. Fur-
ther consideration must also be given to the manner in which a
measure is applied. Should the application be found rigid and in-
flexible, the discrimination may constitute "arbitrary discrimination"
within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX. 1
43
Interestingly, the Appellate Body gave weight to international en-
vironmental agreements concluded since the GATT 1947 was nego-
tiated. This practice, in contrast to the Tuna-Dolphin Panels, should
give some comfort to environmental advocates in the development
of the reasoning practices of the Appellate Body.
5. Shrimp Turtle II
At the conclusion of the initial ruling in the Shrimp-Turtle I dis-
pute, the Dispute Settlement Body made certain recommendations
on measures necessary for the United States to come into compliance
with GATT rules. 144 The U.S failed to change its applicable law,
138. See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 110, 121; see also
TREBILCOCK & HOwSE, supra note 53, at 531-32.
139. See TREBILCOCK & HOwSE, supra note 53, at 530.
140. Shrimp-Turtle JAB Report, supra note 110, 133.
141. Id. 121.
142. Id.
143. Id. 177.
144. Meinhard Doelle, Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Moti-
vate State Action on Climate Change Through the World Trade Organization, 13
REv. EuR. CMTY. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 85, 91 (2004); see also Appellate Body Re-
port, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
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and instead changed the manner in which it applied the law. Spe-
cifically, it established criteria for the certification of exporting
countries aimed at ensuring the protection of sea turtles through the
requirement of measures "comparable in effect" to those of the
United States.1 45 A subsequent challenge was brought by a number
of shrimp exporting countries as to the consistency of this modifica-
tion with WTO rules. 146 The Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle II
upheld the new rules as consistent with Article XX, concluding that
the revised measure was sufficiently flexible to meet the standards of
the chapeau.147 It reasoned that the test of "comparable effective-
ness" was sufficiently flexible to take into account special circum-
stances in the exporting country, while providing the necessary as-
surance to the country applying the environmental measure. 148
The Appellate Body then considered the obligation to pursue nego-
tiations before applying unilateral measures, and the level of flexibil-
ity required for the measure to accord with the chapeau of Article
XX. On the first issue, it was held that serious efforts in good faith
to negotiate are sufficient, but that there is no obligation to conclude
an agreement. 149 With its decision, the Appellate Body clarified any
misconception of a duty to negotiate by concluding that the chapeau
simply amounted to a requirement of a "comparable negotiating ef-
fort."'15 Similarly, in a more recent case involving the United States
and Aruba, the Appellate Body found that there was no duty to "con-
sult" or "negotiate" with respect to measures taken by the United
States to prevent certain gambling and betting services from being
supplied by Aruban service providers. 151 Although the case was
decided under the General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS), the Appellate Body concluded that the general exceptions
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22,
2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle H AB Report]; Panel Report, United States-
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-
Turtle H Panel Report].
145. Doelle, supra note 144, at 91.
146. Id.
147. Shrimp-Turtle IIAB Report, supra note 144, 144.
148. Id. 144 -48.
149. Id. 115-34.
150. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 536.
151. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2005).
[VOL. XX
2009] INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 217
of Article XX were set out in the same manner as those under the
GATS. 152 Accordingly, the Appellate Body found the Panels' re-
quirement of consultations with a view to a negotiated settlement to
be an inappropriate alternative for the Panel to have considered. 153
An interesting side note in the Shrimp-Turtle disputes is that prior
to the Panel being requested in Shrimp-Turtle I, the United States
Court of International Trade ruled, in a case brought by Earth Island
Institute, that the provisions of the Endangered Species Act, which
covered only the Caribbean/Western Atlantic region, had to be ex-
tended worldwide. 15 4 The court issued an order requiring the Secre-
tary of Commerce to ban the importation of shrimp that were not
harvested with fishing methods "comparable" to U.S. standards. 155
As a result of the Panel ruling in Shrimp-Turtle I, Congress modified
the guidelines in 1998. Following the Appellate Body decision in
Shrimp-Turtle I, however, the United States Court of International
Trade ruled that the 1998 revised guidelines permitting the importa-
tion of shrimp caught with TED's from non-certified nations, was
violative of U.S. law.156 This intra-judicial clash raises an interest-
ing question as to what extent the multilateral trading system may be
affected by a U.S. court, or conversely to what extent U.S. legisla-
tion may be affected by declarations of international tribunals.
6. Domestic Emissions Trading
It is widely accepted that the implementation of international and
domestic emissions trading systems will be significant weapons in
the reduction of green house gas (GHG) emissions in the most eco-
nomically efficient manner possible. 15 7 In December 1997, the par-
ties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) agreed to the text of the Kyoto Protocol. 158
Kyoto is the first international agreement with legally binding com-
152. Id. 291.
153. Id. 317.
154. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F.Supp. 559 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1995).
155. Miller & Croston, supra note 61, at 92.
156. See Earth Island Inst. v. Daley, 48 F.Supp.2d 1064 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999).
157. See Brian Evans, Principles of Kyoto and Emissions Trading Systems: A
Primer for Energy Lawyers, 42 ALTA. L. REv. 167 (2004).
158. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 ILM 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
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mitments on the reduction of GHG emissions. 59 With its ratifica-
tion most of the developed world has pledged to modest reduction
targets for the period of 2008-2012. 0' The two largest per capita
emitters, however, the United States and Australia, have so far opted
not to join this effort to address climate change. 161 The reasons giv-
en by the U.S. for refusing to initiate the ratification process, was a
fear of injury to its economy, and the extension of voluntary compli-
ance to developing countries. 1
62
Although the United States has thus far declined to ratify the Kyo-
to Protocol, it would be incorrect to assume that the U.S. has chosen
not to deal with the issue of climate change, and in particular, the
effect of greenhouse gas emissions. 163 In many respects, the United
States has been a pioneer in the use of market-based policy instru-
ments in the environmental arena. 164 A case in point is the Ameri-
can foray into domestic emissions trading. While the practice of
domestic emissions trading does not directly implicate the WTO and
the multilateral trading system, U.S. efforts in this regard illustrate
the government's resolve in reconciling an aggressive environmental
protection agenda with its obligations under the WTO.
....Before elaborating on these efforts a brief description of emissions
trading is in order. Quite simply, emissions trading refers to the
process by which parties can buy or sell permits to emit regulated
substances. 165 Essentially, the benefit that accrues from entitlement
to an allowance or permit becomes a commodity, which can be
traded among market participants. 166 Emissions trading significantly
reduces the cost of controlling GHG's in that it is based on the eco-
nomic principle that where the relative cost of performing an activity
differs among actors, there are potential gains to be made from
trade. 167 There are myriad ways in which an emissions trading sys-
tem can operate, however, the one fundamental approach that will be
addressed in this note is the cap and trade system.
159. Meinhard Doelle, From Kyoto to Marrakech; A Long Walk Through the
Desert: Mirage or Oasis? 25 DALHOUSiE L.J. 113, 118 (2002).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 120.
162. Id.
163. See Evans, supra note 157, at 169.
164. See discussion infra pp. 220-22 1.
165. Evans, supra note 157, at 178.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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A cap and trade system is created when a regulatory body sets a
cap or limit on the absolute amount of emissions permitted from a
source or group of sources. 168 The cap is usually designed to reduce
the amount of emissions by setting the maximum at a lower level
than historically allowed. For example, the Kyoto Protocol based
the limits it imposed on levels from 1990.169 Designed groups of
emitters are then authorized to emit a certain proportion of the total
amount allowed.170 This policy may be practiced on a regional, na-
tional or international level. The Kyoto Protocol is the standard by
which emissions trading is practiced on an international scale. Emit-
ters who successfully reduce their omissions below their allocated
level may sell their unused permits to others who have exceeded
their allocated allowance. Likewise, participants emitting beyond
their allocated allowance and in excess of any additional permits
purchased fTom others would be severely penalized.' 7
Emissions trading is by no means a new concept. For example, in
1982 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) introduced a
new maximum lead content for leaded gasoline. Trading was intro-
duced as part of the EPA's program to reduce the maximum lead
content for leaded gasoline." 2 Participants could create lead rights
capable of being sold to other market participants during the quarter
in which they were created. 173 In addition, the EPA permitted these
credits to be banked and used at a later date.' 74 The lead credit trad-
ing program is credited with reducing the maximum lead content of
gasoline much more rapidly than would have otherwise occurred. 175
More recent efforts by the United States in domestic emissions
trading are seen in the amendments to the Clean Air Act. 176 This
legislation created a comprehensive market-based program for the
control of sulphur dioxide (S02) emissions from coal fired electric
power plants. This program, also known as the Acid Rain Program,
is designed to achieve a significant reduction in S02 emissions from
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Banking of Lead Rights, 50 Fed.
Reg. 13,116 (Apr. 2, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Evans, supra note 157, at 180.
176. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000); see also Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584 (1990).
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electric utilities between 1995 and 2010.177 The Clean Air Act iden-
tifies the sources subject to the legislation along with their allowance
allocation. Allowances were initially issued free of charge and were
based on actual emissions from 1985, subject to certain adjust-
ments. 178 The Acid Rain Program allowance market has been active
since the early 1990's, and as of 2007 the average price paid at the
annual S02 auction was $444.39 per tonne. 179 This program has
been extremely successful in reducing S02 emissions from power
plants in an economically efficient manner. 80
At the regional level, the South Coast Air Quality Management
District (SCAQMD) established the Regional Clean Air Initiatives
Market (RECLAIM). 18' This program is intended to reduce emis-
sions of S02 and N02 in the Los Angeles basin via the capping of
emissions and the allocation of allowances to emitters of S02 and
N02. Each of the facilities identified receives an annual emissions
allocation and an annual rate of reduction in emissions. 182 Initially,
the allowances were issued free of charge to participants based on
prior production levels. 183 Credits are assigned each year and can be
bought or sold for use within that year. 184 Facilities must hold cred-
its equal to their actual emissions, and they can sell excess credits to
firms that cannot or choose not to meet their limits."' By 2003, this
program reduced emissions in N02 by seventy percent and S02 by
sixty percent. 186
In assessing any emissions trading policy, whether it is domestic or
international in scope, its comportment with WTO rules must be
considered. If U.S. federal climate policy were to take the form of a
cap and trade system, questions on its ability to impose a border tax
177. See Evans, supra note 157, at 181. Under the Acid Rain Program, affected
utility units are allocated allowances based on their historic fuel consumption and
a specific emissions rate. Each allowance permits a unit to emit I ton of SO 2 dur-
ing or after a specified year. For each ton of S02 emitted in a given year, one al-
lowance is retired, in that it can no longer be used.
178. Id. at 182.
179. 2007 EPA Allowance Auction Results, available at http://www.epa.gov/
airnarkets/trading/2007/ 07summary.html.
180. Evans, supra note 157, at 182.
181. Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, 40 C.F.R. § 70 (1993) [hereinafter
RECLAIM].
182. Evans, supra note 157, at 183.
183. RECLAIM, available at http:/www.aqmd.gov/reclaini/reclaim.html.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Id.
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adjustment under this system would be raised. 187 Under Article 111:2
of the GATT, a border tax adjustment can be imposed on an im-
ported product equal to an "internal tax or other internal charge of
any kind." This is significant in that if a cap and trade measure or
similar measure (carbon tax), were to be applied domestically the
classification of the allowance as a tax or internal charge would con-
ceivably allow the U.S. to impose a commensurate import levy on
like foreign products. 188 Once again U.S efforts at implementing
domestic environmental policy would be influenced by how the Ap-
pellate Body ruled in this matter.
IV. RECONCILING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE WTO, TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
A. Article XX
During the ongoing conflict between environmental advocates and
proponents of free trade, the decisions from the cases described su-
pra have been relied on to highlight the concerns that environmental-
ists have in this regard. 189 These concerns center on the fear that the
goal of free trade will lead to the relaxation of U.S. environmental
policy.190 This pessimism, however, does not take into account the
existence and usefulness of Article XX of the GATT. The environ-
mentalist outlook is predicated on the premise that there is no objec-
tive measure to overcome the requirements of the GATT in imple-
menting environmental policy. This could not be further from the
truth. Notwithstanding the decisions of the cases already cited, it
should be noted that the Appellate Body has acknowledged, in both
EC-Asbestos and Shrimp Turtle I, the validity of unilateral trade
measures aimed at protecting the environment. 191 While the deci-
sions in these cases did not declare a per se rule against the environ-
187. See Joost Pauwelyn, US. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness
Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 21 (Nicholas Inst.
for Envtl. Pol'y Solutions, Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/knowledge-energy.html.
188. Id.
189. See Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO's Two Step Test for Environmental
Measures Under Article XX, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 117 (2007).
190. Id.
191. See EC-Asbestos 168, supra note 50; Shrimp-Turtle II AB Report 144,
supra note 144.
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mental trade measures employed, they went to some lengths in clari-
fying the standards required for these measures to be suitable for an
Article XX exception. Thus, the Appellate Body recognized the va-
lidity of unilateral trade measures aimed at protecting the environ-
ment, but was also sensitive to their potential for abuse. It is this
type of nuanced balancing act in which the WTO must engage, de-
ciding whether a measure is a disguised restriction on free trade or a
legitimate exercise of self-governance. 192 The WTO has the unenvi-
able task of advancing the goals of the multilateral trading system
while concomitantly taking care not to dilute legitimate efforts of
sovereign states to implement their environmental agenda. There-
fore, rather than condemn the dispute settlement bodies for the con-
clusions that they did not reach, perhaps the more apt response is to
examine those conclusions which were rendered.
Grounds for optimism for environmental advocates lie in the Ap-
pellate Body's move away from the test of whether the measure in
question is the least trade restrictive manner to achieve the environ-
mental objective. Rather, the focus is now on whether there is a less
trade restrictive means of obtaining the same goal. 193 The implica-
tions of this change in position are indicative of the emergence of the
WTO's emphasis on "sustainable development" as a stated goal for
the multilateral trading system. Towards this end, the Appellate
Body has conceded as legitimate under WTO law, the extraterritorial
application of an environmental protection measure. 194 Although
this jurisdictional interpretation by the Appellate Body is relevant
only to the discussion of Article XX (g), it is at the very least more
generous than that of the panels in Tuna-Dolphin I and Tuna-
Dolphin II.
Although unilateral measures will be tolerated the WTO dispute
settlement bodies favor multilateral action over unilateral action. 195
With this in mind it is easier to understand why the U.S. attempts at
applying its environmental protection measures failed. The United
States failure to extend their efforts at multilateral negotiation to all
affected parties, in Shrimp-Turtle I, was at the heart of the Appellate
Body's finding that the measure being evaluated was inconsistent
with the chapeau of Article XX. This again was an immense depar-
192. See Ghei, supra note 189, at 120.
193. EC-Asbestos 172 supra note 50.
194. See Shrimp-Turtle JAB Report 133, supra note 110.
195. See Shrimp-Turtle II AB Report 137, supra note 144; see also Shrimp-
Turtle IAB Report 121, supra note 110.
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ture from the Panel in its earlier decision of this case. The Panel in
Shrimp-Turtle I clearly embraced the view that all unilateral envi-
ronmental measures were inconsistent with the chapeau on the basis
that they threaten the multilateral trading system. 196 The Appellate
Body retreated from this position not just in its analysis of Shrimp-
Turtle I, but also in its subsequent approval of the same measure in
Shrimp-Turtle II.
Once again, in Shrimp-Turtle I, the Appellate Body expanded the
scope of Article XX (g) when it overruled the Panel's view that a
living resource should be distinguished from an "exhaustible natural
resource" within the terms of Article XX (g). Moreover, the Appel-
late Body adopted several multilateral environmental agreements as
interpretational tools in arriving at this conclusion.197 This reliance
on and reference to multilateral environmental agreements in the
context of a WTO dispute is especially noteworthy, and portends a
new approach to the resolution of these types of disputes.
The overall conclusion from the case law to date appears to be that
measures that address environmental protection efforts will be ac-
ceptable under WTO law if those measures treat like products alike.
If they do not, the different treatment will have to be justified under
Article XX (b) or (g). Those most likely to succeed under these pro-
visions will be measures with clear environmental objectives that
have as much flexibility as possible on meeting those objectives.
Measures that are applied without first consult or deliberation with
the countries affected by the measures are also less likely to be saved
by Article XX, unless there is no less restrictive way of achieving
the Article XX (b) or (g) objective.
B. Eco-Labeling
Part of the complaint, not yet addressed in this note, against the
United States in the Tuna-Dolphin I case concerned a labeling
scheme established by certain provisions of the Dolphin Protection
Consumer Information Act (DPCIA).199 In response to the volun-
tary actions of some American companies to implement a "Dolphin-
Safe" tuna label on their products, Congress enacted the DPCIA in
196. FIONA MACMILLAN, WTO AND THE ENVIRONMENT 103 (2001).
197. Id. at 92.
198. Id.
199. Dolphin Consumer Protection Information Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 1385
(2000).
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1990.200 This statute established the requirements for labeling prod-
ucts as "Dolphin-Safe," which were engaged on a voluntary basis by
companies marketing tuna sold in or exported from the U.S. Once
again, the use of purse seine fishing nets were discouraged, and ves-
sels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean could not intentionally set
these nets on dolphins during their voyages. 20 1 The Panel in Tuna-
Dolphin I found this labeling scheme to be consistent with the MFN
obligation of Article 1. 202 This was because the labeling regulations
applied to all countries that fished in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean and involved no distinction based on the products' origin.
203
As a result, the use of what is termed "eco-labeling" has essentially
been adopted by the WTO. 2°
Eco-labeling schemes must comply with all WTO/GATT require-
ments, this includes the TBT Agreement which governs any regula-
tion or standard. While there are areas of overlap between the
GATT and TBT, any potential conflict is governed by the TBT.2 °5
While the majority of mandatory labeling measures will fall under
both the GATT and TBT, the same cannot be said of voluntary
measures. Voluntary eco-labeling related to product characteristics
will fall under the TBT Agreement if they are "standards" within
that defined term of the Agreement. This requires that they be set by
a recognized body such as a governmental organization.20 6 If the
standard is set solely by the private industry with no government
involvement, it may not fall within this definition. 207 Mandatory
standards, on the other hand, will fall within the term "technical reg-
ulation," and thus be subject to the requirements of the TBT. 208
Moreover, should the labeling scheme be found not "related" to the
process and production method, this too would likely preclude its
applicability to the TBT. 20 9 There is an additional emphasis under
the TBT Agreement on the use of international standards as a basis
200. See Miller & Croston, supra note 61, at 99.
201. Id. at 100.
202. See Tuna-Dolphin I 4.02, supra note 59.
203. See id
204. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 17.
205. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, General Inter-
pretive Note to Annex lA, 33 ILM 1144, 1154 (1994).
206. See TBTAgreement art. 1.2 & Annex 1(2), supra note 36.
207. Green, supra note 58, at 163.
208. See TBTAgreement art. 1.2 & Annex 1(1), supra note 36.
209. See discussion, infra pp. 226-231.
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for technical regulations. 210 Article 2.5 of the Agreement creates a
rebuttable presumption that a measure, "in accordance with relevant
international standards," does not create an unnecessary obstacle to
trade.21'
The acceptance of the U.S. eco-labeling scheme with respect to
dolphin-safe tuna seemed to be based primarily on the grounds that
the program's requirements were voluntary and not mandatory.
21 2
The validity of an eco-labeling scheme with respect to WTO obliga-
tions would seem to hinge on whether or not it fits into the voluntary
versus involuntary category. In addition, these two groups are gen-
erally the consequence of whether they are negative or positive in
nature.213 Mandatory schemes require producers or sellers to iden-
tify qualities that consumers may perceive as negative and would
prefer to avoid. 14 Positive labeling, on the other hand, allows pro-
ducers or sellers to identify characteristics that might be deemed de-
sirable by consumers. 215 There is a dearth of case law in this regard,
however, on the basis of the Panel decision in Tuna-Dolphin I, it
would appear that voluntary (positive) labeling schemes stand the
best chance of surviving a WTO challenge. This does not mean that
mandatory (negative) eco-label requirements would not be permissi-
ble under WTO rules. On the contrary, if these requirements are
applied in a non-discriminatory manner, and adhere to both the MFN
and National Treatment obligations, they would likely be found con-
sistent with both of these provisions.216
The position of the WTO on eco-labeling has evolved from the
original decision in Tuna-Dolphin I. It is now generally agreed that
"voluntary, participatory, market based and transparent environ-
mental labeling schemes are economically efficient instruments to
inform consumers about environmentally friendly products." 217 Fur-
thermore, WTO members recognize that eco-labeling schemes tend
210. Green, supra note 58, at 180; see also TBTAgreement art. 2.4, supra note
36.
211. See TBT Agreement art. 2.5, supra note 36; see also Green, supra note 58,
at 180.
212. See MACMILLAN, supra note 196, at 114.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268,
294 (1997).
217. 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 17.
226 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIEW
to restrict trade less than other measures. 218 The latest U.S. effort to
implement an eco-labeling measure involves the "Energy Star" effi-
ciency program. 2 19 Energy Star is a voluntary performance based
labeling scheme covering more than 50 product categories. 220 It is a
self certification measure created with the objective of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, and assisting consumers in identifying
221and purchasing products with enhanced energy efficiency.
The environmental labeling system is a process by which the mar-
ket itself rewards the environmentally friendly producers. This has
the potential for achieving environmental objectives while minimiz-
222ing interference with the multilateral trading system. In light of
the general acceptance of these types of measures, they should prove
to be an invaluable resource to environmental advocates in reconcil-
ing the concerns of trade and the environment.
C. Process and Production Methods
The more problematic issue in the eco-labeling debate has been the
use of criteria linked to the Process and Production Methods (PPMs)
of a given product.223 WTO members agree that countries are within
their rights under WTO law to establish criteria for the manner in
which products are produced, if the method of production leaves a
"trace" in the final product.224 Where members disagree is whether
a measure is consistent with WTO rules when they are based on "un-
incorporated" PPMs. 225 These non-product related PPMs leave no
226trace of the production method in the final product. As a result,
many developing countries contend that any discrimination between
products based on non-product related PPMs, such as some eco-
labels, is inconsistent with WTO law.227 Those PPMs that are di-
rectly related to the characteristics of the product concerned, for ex-
ample, pesticides used on crops or hormones used on cattle in the
218. WTO, Environment: Issues - Labeling, http://www.wto.org/english/tra-
top_e/ envire/labellinge.htm.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Rich, supra note 35, at 21.
223. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 17.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id
[VOL. XX
2009] INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 227
production of meat, are regulated by two separate codes. 228 The
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures (SPS) and the TBT govern the application of such measures. 229
The SPS Agreement governs additives, contaminants, toxins and
disease carrying organisms in consumable products, or damage
caused by the entry, establishment or spread of pests.230 The TBT
Agreement covers all technical requirements, voluntary standards
and the procedures to ensure that these are met, except when they are
SPS measures as defined by the SPS Agreement. 23 1 In Annex 1 of
the TBT Agreement, a technical regulation is defined as a "docu-
ment that lays down product characteristics or their related processes
and production methods." 232  The accepted interpretation of this
clause has been that this excludes non-product related PPMs. 233 The
SPS Agreement includes, in its covered measures, those that apply to
"process and production. 234 Yet because SPS applies to measures
seeking to protect life or health within the territory of the importing
country, non-product related PPMs on imported goods would seem
to be excluded by this limitation.235 These Agreements effectively
serve to limit a state's ability to adopt different treatments for sepa-
rate products with the same physical characteristics on the basis of
how the products were produced or harvested.236
Inherent in the provisions of the SPS Agreement is the question of
the precautionary principle and its relevance in the interpretation of
the Agreement. This is an important question especially in light of
its presence in the Rio Declaration, which provides:
"In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by the States according
228. See Schoenbaum, supra note 216, at 288.
229. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 ILM 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SPS
Agreement]; TBTAgreement, supra note 36.
230. SPSAgreement art. 1.3, supra note 229.
231. Id. at art. 1.4.
232. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 526; see also TBT Agreement
Annex 1, supra note 36.
233. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 526.
234. SPS Agreement 1, supra note 229.
235. See Steven Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental "PPM's " in the WTO:
Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 59, 65 (2002).
236. Schoenbaum, supra note 216, at 288.
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to their capability. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation." 237
Its relevance in international law is underscored by its inclusion in
the Maastricht Treaty. This, notwithstanding, the precautionary
principle is still the subject of some debate. 238 In WTO law the prin-
ciple is implicitly embodied in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement,
which provides that where scientific evidence is insufficient, gov-
ernments may "provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary meas-
ures on the basis of available pertinent information." 239 Even though
the precautionary principle is not explicitly provided for in WTO
legal text, the Appellate Body has spoken on some of the key aspects
of the principle's content in a case involving the European Commu-
nity. Under the SPS Agreement, a member's health measure must
be "based on" a scientific risk assessment.24 1 In EC-Hormones, the
Appellate Body understood the term "based on" to require a rational
242
relationship between the measure and the risk assessment. In so
doing, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's reading that a risk
assessment must have actually been taken into account in the meas-
ure's implementation. 243 The decision in this case recognizes that
where scientific evidence is insufficient, Article 5.7 will justify a
measure not based on a risk assessment. 244 The Appellate Body was
careful to note, however, that although the precautionary principle is
embodied in Article 5.7, it cannot be invoked outside of Article 5.7
to override other provisions of the SPS Agreement.245 The precau-
tionary principle does not supplant any of the provisions of the SPS,
237. Rio Declaration Principle 15, supra note 11.
238. See Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), 123, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC-
Hormones].
239. Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure Based Ap-
proach to the Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 335
(2001-2002); SPS Agreement art 5.7, supra, note 229.
240. See EC-Hormones, supra note 238.
241. See SPS Agreement arts. 2.2, 5.1, supra note 229.
242. See EC-Hormones, supra note 238, 193.
243. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 210.
244. See EC-Hormones, supra note 238, 124.
245. Bohanes, supra note 239, at 336.
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instead the Appellate Body uses it as a tool to interpret those provi-
sions in which it does apply.
246
The Tuna-Dolphin I dispute brought to the forefront the difficulties
involved in accommodating non-product related PPMs. The U.S.
ban on the importation of tuna did not have to do with tuna as a
product, but rather with the way in which it was caught (purse sein
fishing nets which caused the incidental deaths of dolphins). The
Panel's like product analysis in both Tuna-Dolphin I and Tuna-
Dolphin II, concluded that distinctions based on other than the phys-
ical characteristics of a product did not satisfy Article III:4's Na-
tional Treatment obligation.247 Although a different approach has
been taken in other panel decisions, the "trade policy elite has simply
accepted the notion of a sharp divergence between measures on
products and PPMs as if such a distinction had been written into the
GATT all along and not simply invented in the Tuna-Dolphin
case.'248 Since that dispute developing countries have been sensi-
tive to the extraterritorial application, by developed countries, of
their environmental standards. The argument goes that different
countries have different optimum levels of pollution that they are
willing to sustain and trade off in their quest to become more devel-
oped. 249  As these levels differ between countries, one country's
standards should not be imposed on another. 250 Standardizing proc-
ess and production methods can affect the comparative advantage
that a developing country may enjoy.251 Because a disruption of the
cost structure for the production of various goods impacts the less
developed nations of the world more negatively than it might for the
United States, these distinctions are inherently unfair. 252
246. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 210.
247. Id. at 525.
248. Id. at 526. The authors discuss the unadopted Panel Report (US-Taxes on
Gasoline) which took a contrary approach to that taken in the Tuna-Dolphin cases.
Here, the Panel held that the distinction in question - automobiles that met feder-
ally mandated fuel economy requirements, as opposed to those that did not -
served a legitimate non-protectionist objective, the conservation of fossil fuels.
Thus, for purposes of Article III, imports that did not meet the standard were not
considered 'like' products to those that did. This dichotomy of approaches has not
expanded the ambit of non-product related PPMs.
249. See Duncan Brack, Balancing Trade and the Environment, in International
Affairs (Royal Inst. of Int'l Affairs 1944-), Vol. 71 No. 3, Ethics, the Environment
and the Changing International Order 505 (Jul. 1995).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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An attendant argument against the use of PPMs in the environ-
mental policies of developed countries stresses the need to preserve
territorial sovereignty.2 53 This concern was raised by some in the
U.S. when the environmental trade measures, in the cases already
discussed, were found inconsistent with the WTO. The prevention
of discrimination between products on the basis of PPMs means that
254choices made within national boundaries are respected. '  In addi-
tion, developing countries argue that many of the global environ-
mental problems that currently exist have been created by the devel-
oped countries and not themselves, thus, it is those countries that
should bear the greatest burden in their resolution.
255
Critics of these arguments usually respond that other articles of the
GATT do permit discrimination under certain circumstances.
256
Moreover, one nation's territorial sovereignty should not permit that
state to engage in destructive practices that affect those outside of its
borders without some form of remuneration. 257 Although the direct
environmental impact of production methods based in a foreign land
is difficult to assess, there is the fear that the economic consequences
may be more direct.2 58  Domestic producers are encumbered by
higher costs of compliance with the regulatory scheme of the import-
ing country. 259 This raises the fear that they will be undercut by
competition from companies based in countries with significantly
less regulation and lower production costs. 260 This has often been
referred to as the "race to the bottom," where manufacturers will be
led to those countries where costs of production are ostensibly lower
as a result of more lenient environmental policies.
261
The position of the WTO dispute settlement bodies with respect to
non-product related PPMs makes little sense. Domestic environ-
mental regulations on PPMs are the norm. Factories are told how
much pollution they may emit, lumber companies are told how and
where they may harvest trees, and chemical companies are told how
they must treat their waste. So from an environmental perspective, it
253. Motaal, supra note 6, at 333.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., GAT Article XX, supra note 37.
257. See Brack, supra note 249, at 507.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 507-08.
261. See Schoenbaum, supra note 216, at 293.
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makes sense to also be able to discriminate at the border between
otherwise like goods that were produced in environmentally different
ways. Admittedly, allowing discrimination based on PPMs would
present some difficulties for the trading system. It might provide
governments a greater opportunity to protect their domestic indus-
tries unfairly against foreign competition. Notwithstanding the po-
tential for exploitation, non-product related PPMs are an important
tool in managing one of the true global concerns we face today.
They are a reflection of a failed multilateral response, and the efforts
to achieve consensus that have taken precedence over fixing our de-
teriorating environment. While it is easy to point fingers and charac-
terize PPMs as a form of environmental imperialism, at some point
discord has to give way to action. This is not to say that any PPM,
product related or not, should not be subjected to scrutiny by the
WTO to determine whether it is protectionist or not.262 Rather, the
inquiry should be directed at whether the government of the import-
ing country has a legitimate environmental concern about the pro-
duction practices of the exporting country.263 While special consid-
eration should be given to those instances where a non-product re-
lated PPM was initiated at the behest of domestic producers, this
should not be dispositive of protectionist intent. 264
V. CONCLUSION
Over the years, decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
have undergone a protracted but gradual metamorphosis. The early
cases examining the scope of Article XX developed strict interpreta-
tions of the Article's provisions limiting the role for unilateral action
in environmental protection. More recently, however, the Appellate
Body has taken a position more consistent with the global environ-
mental concerns associated with international trade. While this may
be far from the ideal that is currently debated, it does signal a sig-
nificant departure from the early case law involving environmental
trade measures. The Appellate Body has recognized that while uni-
lateral measures are not consistent with the stated goals of the WTO,
262. See Charnovitz, supra note 235, at 74.
263. See id.
264. See id.
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they are justifiable when rooted in the purposes of Article XX and
administered even handedly.265
Recent case law has resulted in a number of other changes with re-
gard to how the WTO examines the environmental trade measures of
its member countries. Diverging from earlier decisions, the Appel-
late Body now recognizes the significance of multilateral environ-
mental agreements in its analysis of contested environmental meas-
ures. The proliferation of eco-labeling schemes is another area of
common ground between the concerns of international trade and en-
vironmental protection. And in yet another variation from an earlier
position, the WTO has come to recognize the validity of trade meas-
ures directed at another member's environmental policies.
The decisions effecting these changes reflected a need for the
WTO to give specific recognition to environmental concerns to
which the WTO responded accordingly. Although there is a sizable
consensus that the decisions discussed in this note were decided cor-
rectly, the WTO adeptly responded to the concerns of its member
nations as well as to the international community at large. This
process of accommodation will require an ongoing effort to respond
to the conflicts that will continue to arise in the fields of international
trade and environmental protection.
While the jurisprudence of the Dispute Settlement Body has been
the mechanism by which many of these changes have occurred, they
were precipitated by a growing international concern regarding the
impact of economic growth on the world's environment. These con-
cerns were distilled in the WTO report on trade and the environment
which reflects the evolving position of the WTO, and is indicative of
the relative importance it now places on reconciling the conflict be-
tween trade and the environment.
265. See Brandon L. Bowen, The World Trade Organization and Its Interpreta-
tion of the Article XX Exceptions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
in Light of Recent Developments, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 181, 201 (2000).
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